Twenty years after the dreadful event of 9/11, the US has
pulled out of Afghanistan. They went in, with a coalition of allies, on October
7th, 2001. They were after Osama Bin Laden, and al-Qaeda, who were
enjoying the protection of the Taliban, then governing Afghanistan, and who
refused US requests to extradite him.[1]
President
George Bush had declared “a war on terror” and had admonished the world’s
nations that “you are either for us or against us”. When it came to Pakistan,
strong words were allegedly spoken, with a threat to bomb Pakistan “back to the
stone age”.[2]
He had also spoken of the way in which the US would hunt down the terrorists,
and pursue them relentlessly and unforgivingly. So when the US troops were
recently subjected to a terrorist attack by a suicide bomber, when thirteen
American service personnel along with dozens of Afghans, desperately besieging
the airport in the hopes of escaping the country, history was repeating itself.
President Joe Biden appeared on TV and spoke directly to the perpetrators: “We
will not forget, we will not forgive. We will hunt you down, and make you pay.”
I understand
that this rhetoric is for domestic consumption as much as anything else.
Americans’ sense of outrage must be addressed and assuaged. But it also signals
a sense of déjà vu, and whether the US is going to learn anything from history.
So what happened to “Speak softly, and carry a big stick”? Wikipedia describes
this quotation of President Theodore Roosevelt’s[3],
as describing his style of foreign policy (which Wikipedia describes as “big
stick ideology, or diplomacy, or policy) that Roosevelt described as “the
exercise of intelligent forethought and of decisive action sufficiently in
advance of any likely crisis”.
The US,
especially since the Second World War, and particularly in the last decades of
the twentieth, and the two decades of this century, has most certainly carried
a big stick. Whether is still is given to “speaking softly” may be open to
debate. I have to say that Biden’s words, quoted above, while directed at a
domestic audience, nevertheless inevitably resound around the world, and may
fall on others’ ears differently from the way US citizens hear them. As for
Roosevelt’s desire for “the exercise of intelligent forethought”, I shall have
more to say on that below.
Wikipedia
outlines “big stick diplomacy” as having five components. They are: (1) having
serious military capability that would force an adversary to pay close
attention; (2) to act justly towards other nations, or as Roosevelt put it in
his speech: “in other words, that it is necessary to be respectful toward all
people and scrupulously to refrain from wronging them, while at the same time
keeping ourselves in condition to prevent wrong being done to us.”[4]
(3) Never to bluff; (4) to strike only when prepared to strike hard; and (5)
willingness to allow the adversary to save face in defeat. “The idea is
negotiating peacefully but also having strength in case things go wrong.”[5]
Let’s
consider the lessons that the US has, or hasn’t learned, using Roosevelt’s
description of “big stick diplomacy” and its components as a template. First of
all, what about “the exercise of intelligent forethought”? Roger Cohen, in a
piece entitled “Delusion in a faraway land”, writes this:
“But America-in-Afghanistan amount to a chronicle
of errors and misjudgements that pose fundamental questions for US
policymakers. From the moment the United States decided to go to war in Iraq in
2003 on the basis of flawed intelligence–opening a second front and diverting
attention and resources from Afghanistan–a sense that the Afghan conflict was a
directionless secondary undertaking grew. Defeating terrorism morphed
perilously into nation building…
The reckoning of this American failure seems
certain to be painful. The inclination to build in the American image–rather
than adapt to simpler, less ambitions (sic) Afghan needs and
capacities–seems to carry a wider lesson for the United States in the world in
the 21st century.
Munter, the former ambassador to Pakistan, led
the first Provincial Reconstruction Team in Mosul, Iraq, in 2006. He recalled
arriving there and finding “there was no plan whatsoever”… “The Mosul
experience”, he added, “seemed like a miniature version of what happened on a
much grander scale in Afghanistan”.[6]
And on the recent US withdrawal
from Afghanistan, Cohen acknowledges that President Trump had bequeathed a
“difficult legacy” to President Biden. Nevertheless, Biden’s “administration
had options short of its accelerated withdrawal.”
“The thing that is appalling is that the
administration had no plan,” said Stephen Heintz, the head of a
foundation that has been working on Afghanistan since 2011. “There was scarcely
any consultation with Nato and little with the Afghan Government. It’s a
failure of intelligence, of planning, of logistics, and in the end a political
failure, because whatever it is, it’s Biden’s.”[7]
Lack of forethought, intelligent
or not, seems to be a common theme in much commentary on US engagement in
foreign countries’ affairs; not to speak of the inclination to invade and to
imagine that “American values” and “democracy” can be easily transported into
these places. Shuja Nawaz, in an unpublished opinion piece entitled “Pakistan’s
existential threat”, writes, for instance, “As for Afghanistan, it is now quite
clear that the United States went in without a comprehensive plan for winning
the war beyond the military ouster of the Taliban.”[8]
Allied
with this lack of foresight, is a kind of hubris and an ignorance of mores and
customs in other parts of the world, and the expectation that “American values”
and “freedom and democracy” à la US style is what is good and wanted by
the rest of the world. This, admittedly, is a generalisation; and is often a
product of political rhetoric by American political leaders. There are plenty
of analysts in the US, diplomats, bureaucrats, “think-tank” members and
commentators who understand the complexities of the world, and the realities of
cultural and national specificities. Nonetheless, the rhetoric is often what
seems to fuel initial decisions and actions.
In
addressing another issue, I should like to adapt Roosevelt’s third component to
“big stick diplomacy”: Never bluff. In its place, I think a better strategy is:
do not be hypocritical over the adherence to espoused values and “democratic”
ideals. Let’s leave aside discussion of the many times the US has supported,
and upheld, dictatorial, totalitarian, or corrupt regimes around the world.[9]
Nor shall we consider the US’s own lapses in maintaining or upholding values it
espouses: the torture of “waterboarding”, excesses at Abu Ghraib, or holding
persons (some innocent) for years at Guantanamo Bay without charge or trial.
When the
US Government negotiated the Doha agreement with the Taliban last year, “[t]he
clauses of the accord acquiesced to every major Taliban demand and gave the
Afghan Government nothing”. The Times
of London article in which this statement appears goes on:
Civil liberties, human and
women’s rights? These are passionate aspirations for the millions of educated
Afghans who have a vision of modernity beyond the limitations of conflict and fundamentalism.
Yet no word of rights, liberty or even democracy is mentioned in the Doha
accord, let alone stipulated as a prerequisite of any ultimate peace
settlement.[10]
This makes a mockery of Western,
especially US, calls for the Taliban to adhere to respect for human rights and
women’s rights now that the coalition forces have departed Afghanistan, and
have allowed the Taliban to reassert their authority. As Cohen quotes an Afghan
entrepreneur, Saad Mohseni as saying: “The Afghans have been pushed under the
bus in the most unfair and irresponsible way.”[11]
Speaking of the fact that the Taliban pose the most immediate threat to
Afghans, “particularly Afghan women, rather than to the United States”, Cohen
quotes Stephen Heintz again: “This is a devastating blow to American
credibility that calls into question how sincere we are when we say we believe
in human rights and women.”[12]
A
further issue is the fact that often the governments that the US was supporting
were riddled with corruption, and the abuse of power. A retired major in the NZ
Army, who served in Afghanistan, “blames poor governance for the relative lack
of opposition to Taliban” advances. “When [locals] aren’t receiving the
benefits of any sort of good governance, when a new crowd comes in, there’s no
will from the people to fight them.”[13] The
Economist makes a similar point, if with a different context in mind: “In
Somalia, where British and Turkish troops have been training the security
forces, getting them to fight in not only a question of their technical
abilities. It is a matter of building up local institutions worth fighting
for.”[14]
And Shuja Nawaz quotes General David Petraeus as saying, “You cannot shoot your
way out of an insurgency. You have to recognize that the military-civil
equation is 20 per cent military and 80 per cent civil and political.”[15]
Unfortunately,
a comment made in defence of President Biden’s withdrawal, only serves to underline
the importance of attending not only to military, but also civil and political
issues. “‘Twenty years was a long time to give Afghan leaders to plant the seed
of civil society, and instead they planted only the seeds of corruption and
incompetence,’ Representative for Massachusetts Jake Auchincloss, a former
Marine who served in Afghanistan, told The New York Times.”[16] I
have read elsewhere that many Afghans preferred the relative efficiency, and
lack of corruption of the Taliban to that of the legitimate Afghan authorities,
despite not liking their ideology. A correspondent for The Times of
London interviewing Ahmad Shah Massoud, the “Lion of Panjshir”, before his
death in 2000, quotes him as saying, in a reflective mood, “I regret that when
I had Kabul I could not do better for the people…And I regret that the system
they lived under was so corrupt.”[17]
It is, perhaps, worth remembering that the success of the Taliban in surviving,
and eventually gaining power again, is built upon the corrupt regimes of a
number of Afghan war lords in various provinces. If there is any consolation in
the rise of the Taliban, it is that once in power they will need to retain the
support of the people. And Islamist militants around the world have not had a
good track record of managing power, nor of avoiding popular dissatisfaction
with their rule.[18]
There
is no doubt that Afghanistan presents a complex, and intractable problem for
Western engagement with it (as are many other, if not all, situations of
conflict and power-struggle). There are so many competing agendas and
interests; and not simply within the country, but around it (the role of
Pakistan in the last twenty year history of Afghanistan could be the topic of
another piece). As far as US engagement with Afghanistan is concerned, the
world is now a different place from what it was in 2001. The role of China, and
its interests in the region, not to speak of its growing economic and political
influence, is a factor. As an aside, if any nation has learned the value of
“speaking softly” it is China: but it has its own “big stick” in the economic
hegemony it has built, and is building up. What lies ahead for US diplomacy in the
world is yet to be determined. The one thing that seems certain is that the
appetite for wielding a “big stick” is currently on the wane. There is not much
desire for it amongst the domestic population. When I was growing up in
Pakistan, it seems to me, the “soft speaking” approach of building up the
infrastructure of that country, of providing economic and technical assistance
was much more to the fore. While analysis of the effectiveness of that approach
is yet to determine its gains (I heard once that many times the amount of aid
had gone into Pakistan as had been poured into Europe under the Marshall Plan,
and to what end?), it may be time again to pivot towards a fresh approach to
foreign policy and practice.
[1] “Briefing, Gobal
Jihadism”, The Economist, August 28th, 2021, 13. New Zealand
followed shortly thereafter, with troops later committed to the Bamiyan
Province for reconstruction work (see Clare De Lore, “A war for good?”, New
Zealand Listener, August 7, 2021, 36).
[2] President Musharraf
alleged this was said by Richard Armitage, Assistant Secretary of State in
Bush’s administration, but it was denied by Armitage; see https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna14943975
[3] The quotation is of a West
African proverb, which in full is: “Speak softly and carry a big stick: you
will go far.” See https://www.britannica.com/event/Big-Stick-policy.
[4] See again https://www.britannica.com/event/Big-Stick-policy;
Roosevelt was here referring to speaking softly as an adjunct to strong
military action, or “the big stick” approach.
[5] See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Stick_ideology.
[6] Roger Cohen, “Delusion in
a faraway land”, Weekend Herald, Saturday, August 21, 2021, A16,17
(emphasis mine).
[7] Cohen, “Delusion in a
faraway land”, A16 (again emphasis mine).
[8] Shuja Nawaz, “Pakistan’s
existential threat”, unpublished piece received by email; quotation on second
page. Though this piece was written in 2010, and largely about the effects of
the insurgency on, and in, Pakistan, it retains its relevance.
[9] I refer anyone interested
in following up this aspect to two books with surprisingly similar titles, both
by American authors: William Blum, Rogue State: A Guide to the World’s Only
Superpower. London: Zed Books, 2nd, updated edition, 2002; and Clyde
Prestowitz, Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good
Intentions. New York: Basic Books, 2003.
[10] Review article, “The
Enduring Fight for Freedom”, Weekend Herald, Saturday, May 9, 2020, A19
(an article originally appearing in The Times of London).
[11] Cohen, “Delusion in a
faraway land”, A16.
[12] Cohen, “Delusion in a
faraway land”, A17.
[13] Kurt Bayer, “The Ones We
Left Behind”, Weekend Herald, Saturday, July 31, 2021, A13.
[14] “Briefing: Global
Jihadism”, The Economist, August 28th, 2021, 16.
[15] Shuja Nawaz, “Pakistan’s
existential threat”, unpublished paper, 2-3.
[16] Rogen Cohen, “Delusion in
a faraway land”, A16.
[17] Review article, “The
Enduring Fight for Freedom”, A20.
[18] See here the article,
“Briefing: Global Jihadism”, The Economist, August 28th,
2021, 16.
