Over the summer, I read a fascinating history of the lead-up to the First World War. It is by Christopher Clark, called The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (London: Penguin, 2012). It is an excellent description and discussion of the years leading to WW1, which brings out very clearly the fact that the "Great Powers" were spoiling for war in the decade leading up to the crisis following the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, Sophie Chotek, in Sarajevo on Sunday 28th of June, 1914.
Over the years prior to 1914 there were many incidents, and much diplomatic and political manoeuvering. The situation in the Balkans, where several lcoal wars were carried out, was a tinder-box. Indeed, there were two Balkan wars before the outbreak of World War 1. Serbia was especially volatile, and restive under Austro-Hungarian rule. The book shows the confusing state of diplomacy, and confused state, too, very much open to the manipulations, and the characters, of various diplomats and politicians. Room for misunderstanding was wide.
Bremmer also writes: "As 2015 dawns, political conflict among the world's great powers is at a higher pitch than at any time since the end of the Cold War. US relations with Russia are now fully broken." It would be ironic if, a century after the first European Continental war, another should erupt.
One of the things that emerges strongly in the narrative is the convoluted and secretive nature of diplomacy in that era. Powerful personalities had a strong influence on diplomatic and political events, and may of these personalities were a strange mix of clear, precise thought and muddle born of insecurities, quirks or male bravado. Clark has a section entitled, "A Crisis of Masculinity?", in which he writes about "the unfortunate configuration of personalities". He writes of how various officials used masculine imagery and "appealed to pointedly masculine modes of comportment" in their descriptions of the threats posed in a number of the crises. A number of the personalities showed an interesting mix of bravado or toughness and fragility.
In this respect, it is interesting to read a story in The New Zealand Herald (7th February, 2015, B4), in which it is reported that a 2008 Pentagon study says that Vladimir Putin has Asperger's Syndrome. This gives him as "sense of physical imbalance and discomfort with social interactions". It means, the story asserts, that 'during crisis, to stabilize himself and his perceptions of any evolving context he reverts to imposing extreme control". It means that he can "withdraw from social stimulation as he did at the time of the Kursk nuclear submarine incident". As an aside, I think that not too much weight should be put on personality factors, as there are surely many other aspects, such as upbringing, education, experiences, and societal, religious or political conditioning that contribute to how a person acts and reacts.
However, on this theme, after the assassination of the Archduke adn his wife in Sarajevo, and when Austria had determined that Serbia was behind the act, the Austrian government presented an ultimatum of certain undertakings that Serbia had to make in respect of following up on the perpetrators and curbing "Serbian irredentism". When the ultimatum was presented to the Serbian authorities, the Serbian Prime Minister was away electioneering. On receiving the news of the ultimatum, Pasic, the PM, decided to go off on a short holiday (see pp. 457-60). Why did Pasic act in this way? A momentary desire to avoid taking on the responsibility of dealing with the situation is one possible reason (p. 460; Clark points out that Pasic had also taken his family on holiday in the summer of 1903, when he received details of a planned assassination of the Serbian king and queen).
One of the aspects that Clark's book brings out is the role of Russia in precipitating the outbreak of war. The government there engaged in various pre-mobilization and mobilization activities that provoked a response from Germany, and its mobilization in response. Germany to that time, it would seem, had done little in the fact of the crisis July 1914. Nevertheless, it was the Germans who first began offensive action by invading Belgium to try and preempt a French attack, or rather to destroy their western opponent before turning to deal with the eastern opponent (Russia).
Furthermore, the convoluted nature of international relations (and a confirmation of alliances and policies already in place) is found in the fact that such a plan (of attacking France through "neutral Luxembourg and Belgium") had existed as part of German military planning since 1905 (see p. 547).
In drawing conclusions about the build up to the "Great War", Clark makes the point that ther is a need to distinguish between the "objective factors acting on the decision-makers, and the stories they told themselves and each other about what they thought they were doing and why they were doing it. All the key actors in our story filtered the world through narratives that were built from pieces of experience glued together with fears, projections and interests masquerading as maxims. In Austria, the story of a nation of youthful bandits and regicides endlessly provoking and goading a patient elderly neighbour got in the way of a cool-headed assessment of how to manage relations with Belgrade. In Serbia, fantasies of victimhood and oppression by a rapacious, all-powerful Habsburg Empire did the same in reverse" (p. 558).
What are the stories we tell ourselves about those whom we perceive as our "enemies", or who are different from us? The lead-up to the outbreak of World War 1 tells us, I suggest, that we must beware of stereotypes. For when a crisis comes, it is all too easy for those stereotypes to take over and for us to act out of our notions of others based on the stereotypes, rather than reacting to them as other human beings, or by weighing the actual factors that may be creating the situation.
Why were the leaders of the European powers "sleepwalkers"? Partly, argues Clark, because they were unable to appreciate the enormity of the risks and the full horror of what they were likely to unleash. Even though some spoke of the approach of "Armaggeddon", or a "war of extinction" and the "extinction of civilization", they failed to avert disaster because of mixed motives, and divided opinions or expectations. "In the minds of many statesmen", writes Clark, "the hope for a short war and the fear of a long one seem, as it were, to have cancelled each other out, holding at bay a fuller appreciation of the risks...In this sense, the protagonists of 1914 were sleepwalkers, watchful but unseeing, haunted by dreams, yet blind to the reality of the horror they were about to bring into the world" (p. 562).
Over the years prior to 1914 there were many incidents, and much diplomatic and political manoeuvering. The situation in the Balkans, where several lcoal wars were carried out, was a tinder-box. Indeed, there were two Balkan wars before the outbreak of World War 1. Serbia was especially volatile, and restive under Austro-Hungarian rule. The book shows the confusing state of diplomacy, and confused state, too, very much open to the manipulations, and the characters, of various diplomats and politicians. Room for misunderstanding was wide.Clark makes an interesting comment about a loan made to the Bulgarian government, by the Germans, which is echoed in a recent Time magazine. Clark writes: "The loan had become a dangerous tool weilded by the alliance blocs. This weaponization of international credit was nothing new, but its deployment in this instance locked Bulgaria into the policy of the Triple Alliance, just as Serbia had been integrated into the political system of the Entente" (p. 278).Ian Bremmer, writing in Time about the coming year and providing predictions about what lies ahead, writes: "International finance will be weaponized". He writes about how the Obama Administration "wants to exert significant influence around the globe. That's why Washington is turning finance into a weapon. It is using carrots (access to capital markets) and sticks (various kinds of sanctions) as tools of coersive diplomacy" (Time, 19th January, 2015, p. 10).
Bremmer also writes: "As 2015 dawns, political conflict among the world's great powers is at a higher pitch than at any time since the end of the Cold War. US relations with Russia are now fully broken." It would be ironic if, a century after the first European Continental war, another should erupt.
One of the things that emerges strongly in the narrative is the convoluted and secretive nature of diplomacy in that era. Powerful personalities had a strong influence on diplomatic and political events, and may of these personalities were a strange mix of clear, precise thought and muddle born of insecurities, quirks or male bravado. Clark has a section entitled, "A Crisis of Masculinity?", in which he writes about "the unfortunate configuration of personalities". He writes of how various officials used masculine imagery and "appealed to pointedly masculine modes of comportment" in their descriptions of the threats posed in a number of the crises. A number of the personalities showed an interesting mix of bravado or toughness and fragility.
In this respect, it is interesting to read a story in The New Zealand Herald (7th February, 2015, B4), in which it is reported that a 2008 Pentagon study says that Vladimir Putin has Asperger's Syndrome. This gives him as "sense of physical imbalance and discomfort with social interactions". It means, the story asserts, that 'during crisis, to stabilize himself and his perceptions of any evolving context he reverts to imposing extreme control". It means that he can "withdraw from social stimulation as he did at the time of the Kursk nuclear submarine incident". As an aside, I think that not too much weight should be put on personality factors, as there are surely many other aspects, such as upbringing, education, experiences, and societal, religious or political conditioning that contribute to how a person acts and reacts.
However, on this theme, after the assassination of the Archduke adn his wife in Sarajevo, and when Austria had determined that Serbia was behind the act, the Austrian government presented an ultimatum of certain undertakings that Serbia had to make in respect of following up on the perpetrators and curbing "Serbian irredentism". When the ultimatum was presented to the Serbian authorities, the Serbian Prime Minister was away electioneering. On receiving the news of the ultimatum, Pasic, the PM, decided to go off on a short holiday (see pp. 457-60). Why did Pasic act in this way? A momentary desire to avoid taking on the responsibility of dealing with the situation is one possible reason (p. 460; Clark points out that Pasic had also taken his family on holiday in the summer of 1903, when he received details of a planned assassination of the Serbian king and queen).
One of the aspects that Clark's book brings out is the role of Russia in precipitating the outbreak of war. The government there engaged in various pre-mobilization and mobilization activities that provoked a response from Germany, and its mobilization in response. Germany to that time, it would seem, had done little in the fact of the crisis July 1914. Nevertheless, it was the Germans who first began offensive action by invading Belgium to try and preempt a French attack, or rather to destroy their western opponent before turning to deal with the eastern opponent (Russia).
Furthermore, the convoluted nature of international relations (and a confirmation of alliances and policies already in place) is found in the fact that such a plan (of attacking France through "neutral Luxembourg and Belgium") had existed as part of German military planning since 1905 (see p. 547).
In drawing conclusions about the build up to the "Great War", Clark makes the point that ther is a need to distinguish between the "objective factors acting on the decision-makers, and the stories they told themselves and each other about what they thought they were doing and why they were doing it. All the key actors in our story filtered the world through narratives that were built from pieces of experience glued together with fears, projections and interests masquerading as maxims. In Austria, the story of a nation of youthful bandits and regicides endlessly provoking and goading a patient elderly neighbour got in the way of a cool-headed assessment of how to manage relations with Belgrade. In Serbia, fantasies of victimhood and oppression by a rapacious, all-powerful Habsburg Empire did the same in reverse" (p. 558).
What are the stories we tell ourselves about those whom we perceive as our "enemies", or who are different from us? The lead-up to the outbreak of World War 1 tells us, I suggest, that we must beware of stereotypes. For when a crisis comes, it is all too easy for those stereotypes to take over and for us to act out of our notions of others based on the stereotypes, rather than reacting to them as other human beings, or by weighing the actual factors that may be creating the situation.
Why were the leaders of the European powers "sleepwalkers"? Partly, argues Clark, because they were unable to appreciate the enormity of the risks and the full horror of what they were likely to unleash. Even though some spoke of the approach of "Armaggeddon", or a "war of extinction" and the "extinction of civilization", they failed to avert disaster because of mixed motives, and divided opinions or expectations. "In the minds of many statesmen", writes Clark, "the hope for a short war and the fear of a long one seem, as it were, to have cancelled each other out, holding at bay a fuller appreciation of the risks...In this sense, the protagonists of 1914 were sleepwalkers, watchful but unseeing, haunted by dreams, yet blind to the reality of the horror they were about to bring into the world" (p. 562).
