ISRAEL and PALESTINE: Can They Ever Co-Exist?

 

I begin with two foundational statements which undergird my approach.

First, Israel has the right to exist and to live in security within its borders. This must be accepted by all parties–including those Arab states (and other nations, e.g. Iran, Pakistan) who still hold out against its existence. It seems to me, however, that for a number of Arab states, for a variety reasons, some self-interested no doubt, have come to that conclusion (see e.g. “the Abraham Accords”). Jordan, whom some consider should be the “Palestinian State”, has had a peace treaty with Israel since 1994. Interestingly, I have in my files a newspaper clipping headed “Arabs ‘ready to admit Israel’s right to exist’”. The clipping comes from The Christchurch Press, dated 16/9/1983 following a UN conference which ended with a final declaration the acknowledged “the right of all States in the region to existence with secure and internationally recognised boundaries, with justice and security for all the people.” The writer, Liesl Graz, wrote: “Decoded that means the Arab States and the Palestine Liberation Organisation are ready, for the first time in a formal document, to admit Israel’s right to exist with the quid pro quo of the right to exist of a Palestinian state.” What happened to that “olive branch”, I wonder?

Nonetheless, my second foundational statement, Palestine as a homeland for Palestinians also needs to be recognised as a legitimate state. Palestinians lived there–and many still do–for generations. There needs, therefore, to be a “Two-State” solution (more of this anon).

The past is the past: it cannot be changed, but it need not continually cripple the future. The creation of Israel is a complex and mixed story. There were injustices, outright subterfuges and duplicity from the beginning (think the “Balfour Declaration” and the Sykes-Picot Agreement). But very few nations have a “pure” genesis. My own country, Aotearoa New Zealand has its own shady bits in its history of creation and subsequent story. And most countries have suffered from the effects of colonisation. So Israel’s history is no more and no less a reason to say that it should not exist.

Over the intervening years, in the decades since 1948, there have been missed opportunities, and exercises in bad faith on both sides. Perhaps the aftermath of the conference reported on above was one missed opportunity. The continued occupation and the establishment of Israeli settlements on the West Bank is an instance of bad faith. Arguably, a missed opportunity and an instance of bad faith on the Palestinian side, came with the refusal of Yasser Arafat to accept the conditions offered by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak at the Camp David meeting hosted by President Bill Clinton in December 2000. Although the different assessments of the genuineness and fairness of those proposals indicates how difficult and complex, and often quite partisan, attempts at peace settlement are.[1]

On the other hand, there have been, and there are stories of goodwill and efforts at mutual understanding on both sides. Many Israelis, and Jews outside of Israel, recognise and support the Palestinian right to their own homeland, and oppose Israel’s occupation of the West Bank. A heartwarming account by Izzeldin Abuelaish tells of his experiences as a doctor living in Gaza who was able to work alongside Jewish colleagues in a hospital in Israel. His friends and colleagues in the hospital were genuinely and deeply concerned about the privations he experienced trying to cross the border from Gaza into Israel, and also for his and his family’s safety when the Israeli Defence Force shelled their home on one of its incursions into Gaza. Despite the fact that three of his daughters and a neice were killed when Israeli shells hit their home, Abuelaish believes Israelis and Palestinians can live together in peace if they can only get to know one another. Co-operation and co-existence are possible but politicians must take a lead in become “humanitarians”. [2]

We should not forget, too, that there are Palestinians who are Israeli citizens. There are, perhaps, sometimes questions to be asked about whether or not they are treated as “second class” citizens. That is an issue for Israeli society to determine and to fix if necessary. As an aside, I note that it was reported that Palestinian Israelis were among the first of those who rushed to help the vicitms of the Hamas militants’ recent incursion into Israel.[3]

The Two-State Solution.

A two-state solution, Israel and the State of Palestine, based on the 1967 borders should be established. A corridor for safe travel between the West Bank and Gaza will need to be enabled at a minimum, but I would hope that my suggestion of a Schengen-style arrangement outlined below would remove the need for that. Interestingly, Phyllis Bennis canvassing the possibilities for “an independent, viable, and sovereign State of Palestine in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem” goes on to write this:

   But as the construction of the Apartheid Wall and the continued expansion of the 440,000 settlers in huge city-sized settlements throughout the West Bank and East Jerusalem seem to make the creation of a viable Palestinian state impossible, more and more Palestinians are reconsidering the goal of creating a democratic secular or bi-national state in all of historic Palestine–encompassing what is now Israel, the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem. Many, perhaps most Palestinians and at least a few Israelis, believe that over the long-term it is in the best interests of both peoples, even if there were an independent and sovereign Palestinian state, to create a single state, based on absolute equality for both nationalities and equal rights for all its citizens.[4]

For the present, it is perhaps a more realistic, though difficult enough objective to obtain a Palestinian State alongside Israel. I would suggest if such a state were to be created, the following parameters should obtain.

1.      Settlements: Of course, no new settlement should be built or begun in the West Bank, (nor within Palestinian areas of East Jerusalem). However, residents of the existing settlements should not be required to move, and existing settlements should not be dismantled. What should happen is that the Jewish residents there should become citizens of the Palestinian state just as there are Arab Israelis. They could, if they wished, choose to relocate within the borders of Israel. Hopefully, by adopting this policy, the angst, anger, and disruption that would likely ensue if settlements were dismantled, or residents evicted forcibly, would be avoided.

2.      There should be a common defence force, committed to the security of both states. Of course, each state could have its own police force, though there would be advantages to having a close cooperation between the two. Hopefully a common defence force would remove the possibility, or lessen the likelihood, of conflict between the two states.

3.      There should be a “Schengen-Area” type arrangement for travel and movement between the two states. That is, Israelis and Palestinians should be able to travel freely into each territory on  their passports or identification papers.

4.      The two states should work towards establishing a common economic zone and market (like the EU), but perhaps without the political structure (i.e. an EU-style parliament). The arrangement would be more of an economic-treaty affair. This would hopefully be also extended over time to include the whole region, and certainly including Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt.

This will only really be workable if there is at the same time (both before and alongside) the creation of a two-state solution, a concerted effort by Israelis and Palestinians of goodwill to get to know one another.  Building up trust will be a long process. I imagine it may take several generations. There may need to be structural mechanisms (e.g. “Truth and Reconciliation Commissions”?) to address past hurts, injustices and misunderstandings. Certainly movements within civil society (some of which already exist) that promote peace and mutual understanding will need to be strengthened and broadened.

Finally, I know that it is always easy for those on the outside, and faraway to think they see where the problems lie and how to address them. Israelis and Palestinians will have to work this out themselves. Peace and mutual understanding, not to mention that ability to live together in close proximity, will be best achieved when they work out the strategies and processes that will enable a better future.

[Note: Phyllis Bennis, Inside Israel-Palestine: The Conflict Explained. Oxford: New Internationalist, 2007, provides a good question-and-answer introduction to the issue.  This is a good book to start with. A blog I wrote earlier, which appears below: "Israel/Palestine: A Lenten Course of Reading" (published April 22, 2020) contains a description of some other books, including the one by Izzeldin Abuelaish, and another by a Jewish American Rabbi Michael Lerner that includes some interesting proposals or "strategies" for dealing with the situation 

Leslie Stein, an Australian academic has written three books on the history of the creation and history of the State of Israel until 2014. They are: The Hope Fulfilled: The Rise of  Modern Israel. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003; The Making of Modern Israel 1948-1967. Cambridge, UK/Malden, MA: Polity, 2009; and Israel Since the Six-Day War: Tears of Joy, Tears of Sorrow. Polity, 2014.

Two excellent histories are: 

Anton La Guardia, Holy Land, Unholy War: Israelis and Palestinians. 3rd Edition; London: Penguin, 2007.

David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East. New York: Henry Holt, 1989.

Paul Danahar, The New Middle East: The World After the Arab Spring. London: Bloomsbury, 2013, has a couple of very interesting chapters on Israel, including one that gives an insight into the complexities of Israeli society.

Finally, Mitri Raheb, The Politics of Persecution: Middle Eastern Christians in an Age of Empire. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, has written an important book from a Palestinian Christian perspective, which covers the plight of Christians in the Middle East from 1799 until the Arab Spring. It includes an argument that the story of "persecuted Christians" is a Western construct to serve Western national interests.]

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[1] For such different assessments, and, indeed, descriptions of the nature of the negotiations, see e.g. Leslie Stein, Israel Since the Six-Day War: Tears of Joy, Tears of Sorrow (Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity, 2014), 245–47, where he writes of the Palestinians missing “an historic opportunity” because they insisted on Israel coming their way “on all the issues on which it procrastinates” (his emphasis) including the right of Palestinians to return to their former homes. Anton La Guardia, Holy Land, Unholy War: Israelis and Palestinians (3^rd edition; London: Penguin, 2007) describes how “Prince Bandar, the Saudi ambassador in Washington, told Arafat his refusal to accept the Clinton parameters was ‘a crime’ against Palestinians and the Arab world.” (300). Phyliss Bennis, however, in Inside Israel-Palestine: The Conflict Explained (Oxford: New Internationalist, 2007), writes that Barak’s “‘generous offer’ was a myth” because it did not meet “the requirements of international law”, and because of that fact that “the disparity of power that had long characterized Israel-Palestinian negotiations remained unchallenged”, (see pp. 145–46). Assessments of bad faith often depend upon whose side one is on: or on perspectives determined by a particular stance.

[2] Izzeldin Abuelaish, I Shall Not Hate: A Gaza Doctor’s Journey on the Road to Peace and Human Dignity (London: Bloomsbury, 2011).

[3] The New Zealand Herald,  11/10/2023, A 17.

[4] Bennis, Inside Israel-Palestine: the Conflict Explained, 183–84; main quote on p. 184.

Critique and comment on Julian Batchelor's booklet, Stop Co-Governance

 

Julian Batchelor, Stop Co-Governance.

Clearing out Anna’s letterbox, while she’s away, I came across a little booklet. It is basically a lot of propaganda in an effort to discredit the concept of co-governance. Along the way it also attempts to trash the Waitangi Tribunal.

It’s also an extremely misleading document. That is being generous. It’s a combination of twisted history and conspiracy theory.

It begins like this, in outlining “The Problem”. “When asked about co-governance, many Kiwis think it’s harmless. They say things like “Oh, co-governance is not big deal. It’s just Maori and government governing the country together. I am OK with it. It’s simply power sharing…Nothing could be farther from the truth…Rather, it’s about private tribal companies and tribal representatives taking control of the country.” (4)

If indeed “many Kiwis” think that co-governance is about “Maori and government governing the country together” then they are seriously misinformed about what co-governance is. I suspect that this is just the first instance of the “spin” that Batchelor puts on the issue. He frequently refers, throughout his booklet, to “private tribal companies and tribal representatives” who are working to take over the country: to carry out a “coup”. Never once, does Batchelor say who he means by “private tribal companies”, or “tribal representatives”.

Batchelor states that co-governance arises out of a twisting of the Treaty of Waitangi. Though Batchelor acknowledges “Te Tiriti” as the document that Māori signed in 1840, he claims that it was based on an English draft called the “Littlewood draft”, which was the “final English draft” and represents in English what the te reo Māori version says.

There is no clear evidence that this is the English draft, from which the Māori version was made. As I understand it, the Māori version was translated by the missionary Henry Williams and his son Edward, from some notes made by William Hobson and a secretary, and a draft drawn up by James Busby. Claudia Orange, in The Story of A Treaty (2013), states that “Busby had added an important promise: that Britian would guarantee Māori possession of their lands, their forests, their fisheries and other prized possessions. Without that promise he was sure no one would sign.” (21).

This is important, because Batchelor wants to promote the “Littlewood draft” as the English original from which the Māori was drafted because the important second article which guaranteed these things does not specifically mention forests, fisheries etc. It reads: “The Queen of England confirms and guarantees to the chiefs and the tribes and to all the people of New Zealand, the possession of their lands, dwellings and all their property.” (Stop Co-Governance, 7).

I had not heard of the “Littlewood Draft”.  Batchelor says this about it: “It has this name because this draft was given to a lawyer by the  name of Henry Littlewood soon after the Treaty was signed at Waitangi. It went missing and was found in Auckland in 1989. Forensic analysis confirmed it was the final English draft. However, under pressure from activists, aided by politicians afraid of losing Maori votes, it was quickly taken out of sight by government officials and hidden away, to this day. [New paragraph]. When one compares the Treaty in Maori with the Littlewood draft, we could say that they are identical. This is how historians can tell that it was the Littlewood final draft which was used to draw up the Treaty in Maori in 1840.” (Stop Co-Governance, 6–7).

This is a very tendentious argument. It is unlikely that the Littlewood Draft existed before the drawing up of the Treaty. It is likely a document drawn up later (perhaps an attempt at getting at the gist of the Māori version?). If you want a “forensic analysis” of the Littlewood Draft, a good place to start would be to read a piece by Donald Loveridge, “The ‘Littlewood Treaty’: An Appraisal of Texts and Interpretation” (Google it). Appendix 1 will give you the text of the Littlewood draft; and Appendix 2 is the “English text of the Treaty of Waitangi sent to Sydney by Captain Hobson...etc” (which, given its source and dating, should be taken as the official English version, and is the one printed in most books about the Treaty). It should perhaps be noted in passing that is it probably impossible to get an exact (or truly equivalent) English translation of the Māori version, and exegeting the Māori (which is the version that should take precedence) is probably difficult and is what leads to the debates.

Batchelor also evokes the mythical (my word) “Tax Payer”. This generally means, it seems to me, the crowd that the writer wants to identify as the “Tax Payer”, and refers to the writer and his (or her) ilk. For instance, one suspects from the way that Batchelor writes, that Māori are not to be considered tax payers with a legitimate claim on how their taxes are used.  For example, he writes: “...New Zealand tax payers are funding private tribal companies/tribal representatives to take over their country.” (22) Later he claims that “Tribal Rule means that private tribal companies/tribal representatives will be completely running/controlling the country by 2040...99.5% of Kiwis will be disenfranchised.” (24). One might point out that somewhere between 12 to 15 percent of Kiwis identify as Māori.

Batchelor considers that “things started to really go wrong” with passing of the 1975 Treaty of Waitangi Act and the setting up of the Waitangi Tribunal. This exists to hear Māori claims to injustices, breaches to the Treaty and confiscations of Māori land carried out since the signing of the Treaty. “The Tribunal became a scam, a place where any Maori anywhere could bring a grievance, and then a claim, and the claim (i.e. cash and assets) would highly likely be honoured by the Tribunal.”  (11) This misrepresents the work of the Tribunal, where most cases are brought by tribes, or tribal entities and there is often a long process before any settlement is made. And while it is true that any Māori may make a claim, it is certainly not true, as Batchelor goes on to claim, that “only Maori could attend hearings” (11).

Batchelor cites a number of “historians”, and quotes some of their views. My impression is (from a Google search) that these persons would best be described as “amateur historians”, as their main training has been in some other field, e.g. engineering, or mathematics, and so forth. Somewhat surprisingly, he cites Sir Apirana Ngata in support of land confiscations. While he quotes Ngata correctly, he does so selectively. The quotation highlighted: “The confiscations cannot therefore be objected to in the light of the Treaty.” (Stop Co-Governance, 10), is followed immediately in the next paragraph by this statement: “The objections should be made in the light of the suffering of some of the tribes by reason of the confiscation of their lands.”

https://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-NgaTrea-t1-g1-t1.html  (p. 16)

The booklet Stop Co-Governance has been deemed an election advertisement by the Electoral Commission (and carries a statement to that effect in the back, although the author disputes the designation). The issue of co-governance is a large and contentious one in New Zealand at present. I will not go into it now, except to say that it takes various forms, and in some instances refers to a partnership at a local level (say over a given waterway) between Māori and non-Māori. It often entails the establishment of a board or committee of oversight that has representation of Māori on it, alongside local non-Māori members. A quick way in to it is to visit these links:

https://www.newsroom.co.nz/co-governance-its-nothing-like-you-think

https://oag.parliament.nz/2016/co-governance/part1.htm

And on the Waitangi Tribunal

https://www.waitangitribunal.govt.nz/about/

And from the above page, see link to Te Manutukutuku, Issue 69, January 2016, celebrating the 40th anniversary of the Tribunal’s establishment.

A Prophet Without Honor: A Novel of Alternative History, by Joseph Wurtenbaugh

 

Imagine that, when Hitler moved to occupy and remilitarize the Rhineland in 1936, Britain and France had known that a secret order had been issued that the Wehrmacht was to immediately and peacefully withdraw to the frontier of the demilitarized zone, should there be any opposition from these two “Western” powers. This order was at the insistence of the Wehrmacht high command, who were opposed to this act of military aggression, because the rearmament of Germany had only just begun, and the German military would have easily been routed by quite a small force sent against it by either Britain or France.

            The premise of this novel is that what, in fact, happened was that the knowledge of this secret order was leaked to the British Government, who shared it with the leadership of France, so that, knowing that Hitler was bluffing, they stood up to his action, and forced the retreat of the German army. The consequence of this was that the Nazi regime fell, and the Third Reich ended then.

            This novel tells the story of how this came about. It details the life of a major actor in the betrayal of the order to the Western powers. This was a German Leutnant, Karl von Haydenreich, who was in the Abwehr, the German Army’s Intelligence Service, who gave the coded messages to Major Dwight D. Eisenhower, serving as a military attaché to the US Embassy in Berlin (and was Karl’s “god-father”) who then passed them on to an intelligence officer at the British Embassy. Von Haydenreich was receiving the information he passed on from General Kurt von Hammerstein Equord, Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht (formerly the Reichswehr).

            The book is very interestingly plotted and the narration proceeds by means of a series of extracts from various sources: Autobiographies, and books, written by leading military men, a journal kept by Karl von Heydenreich, a book by Eisenhower, and various histories and accounts written by historians and others, as well as letter-extracts, and file notes. The extracts purportedly from historical characters are all fictional pieces.

The period covered is from before the birth of Karl, his upbringing and education in both Germany and, for a period, in a private school in England, his desire to study music and become a composer, and his eventual entry into the Reichswehr as an officer, and commission in the Abwehr. Through these devices, the reader learns about the motivations behind Karl von Heydenreich’s actions, and the influences upon him that led him to do what he did.

            The book also outlines the rise of Hitler and the Nazi Party, and gives a sense of what it was like to live in Nazi Germany. It also details such things as the casual racism, and anti-Semitic attitudes that existed in Germany even prior to the rise of Hitler. It profiles both Karl’s father, and his step-mother who had a major influence on him during his childhood and upbringing.

            In a note at the end of the book, Wurtenbaugh (the pen-name of Frank Dudley Berry) states that “the antics of Adolf Hitler described in the story, no matter how apparently excessive or bizarre, are all drawn from actual behaviors that he exhibited at various moments during his career.” (482). Whether the extreme and childish behaviour that is described at the climax of the story actually happened (in real life) is difficult to imagine. Hitler was certainly given to ranting and raving, and could work himself up into a frenzy. But he was also an actor, who could put on a show for effect: whether he would do something likely to demean himself in the eyes of others is questionable, although he did feel himself to be a “man of destiny” and considered himself so much in command of situations and other people that he probably felt immune from criticism or scorn.

            This book is also interesting from the point-of-view of the way in which it provides an insight into this period of history from various standpoints, and perspectives. It shows not only opposition to Nazi Germany but also support for it. It details the perils and difficulties of taking political decisions that are not popular because the reasons for them are not understood or known by the general populace.

            This is a work of historical fiction, and as the author says, also of “alternative historical fiction”. Where there are actual, historical figures appearing, their careers have been “significantly re-imagined” (ix). It is a book that captures something of the essence of what it must have been like to have lived through the early years of Nazi Germany (and, in some senses, what it was like throughout the period of the Third Reich).

(Novel self-published by Frank Dudley Berry, Jr. in 2017)

America the Superhero

I have suspected for some time that some Americans believe too literally in their action movies. In particular, they think that the superhero approach to solving the world’s problems, which they see in these types of films, is the answer. Now I have some support for this suspicion, in a book by Robert Jewett and John Shelton Lawrence called Captain America and the Crusade against Evil: The Dilemma of Zealous Nationalism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003).

            The authors describe what they call the crusading zealous nationalism that characterises much of the approach that the United States takes to the rest of the world. This mirrors the myth of “Captain America”, a cartoon character dedicated to saving the world and securing it for freedom and democracy, by the use of violence if necessary (it generally is). America’s sense of being “Captain America” in the world has a long history and is deeply embedded in the national consciousness. It had its foundations in the Puritan impulse to religious violence: to “convert” the world to its view of how things should be by force. When the first missionaries were sent to Hawaii, the Rev. Heman (ironic name) Humphrey preached a sermon in 1819 comparing their missionary endeavours to ancient Israel’s conquest of Canaan (p. 251).

            Another motivation for America’s crusading zeal is its sense of Manifest Destiny. Many Americans see their nation as fulfilling the role of a “city on a hill”, taking the benefits of their way of life to other nations. They see their nation as “innocent”, and unready to resort first to violence, but needing to do so in the face of evil forces ranged against it (or threatening to take over other nations). Feeding this sense of mission is the tendency towards conspiracy theories: perhaps the most obvious one in the twentieth century was the “domino theory” of the fall of South-East Asian nations to communism, if nothing were done to stop its spread from North Vietnam.

            The book traces the story of American “Captain America” syndrome and “redemptive violence” from its early days, through the Mexican-American war (1846–48), the Spanish-American war (1898), two world wars, the wars in Korea and Vietnam, through to the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan following the attacks on 9/11. Alongside the “Captain America” syndrome, the belief in conspiracy, sits a tendency to think, speak, and act against stereotypes: “the Hun”, “Japs” “Gooks,” or “Arabs”. To be fair, this is a general human tendency, not confined to Americans.

            One of the most common, and in a sense dangerous, stereotypes is found in the “good guy/bad guy” rhetoric. This stereotype, and its association with movies, is captured nicely in a story they tell of Reagan’s annoyance when his space based defense initiative was given the moniker “Star Wars”. Reagan saw it as a defensive stratagem and a move to ensure peace. In fact, a defence analyst Fred Reed stated that “Star Wars, if it works, will be an offensive weapon of absolute power” (p. 118, italics original). A film scholar Michael Rogin “reviewed Reagan’s movies and discovered that, in Murder in the Air (1940), [Reagan] played an agent maintaining the secrecy and security of ‘the Inertial Projector’, which ‘stops and destroys anything that moves.’ It had just the qualities sought for in Captain America’s religion of defense.” (119) Richard Perle, Reagan’s “brilliant young assistant secretary of defense, told colleagues that he thought the name [Star Wars] wasn’t so bad. ‘Why not,’ he said, ‘It’s a good movie. Besides, the good guys won’.” (p.107, quoting Frances FitzGerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000, p. 39).

            In my opinion, the “good guy/bad guy” stereotype is particularly dangerous as it is applied as a defence of gun ownership. “Good guys” have to own guns, and, no doubt, carry them, so as to be ready to stop the “bad guys” with guns. The problem is that most people with guns are considered “good guys” until they go bad. The idea that a “good guy” carrying a gun will be able to pre-emptively stop a “bad guy” killing with a gun is most of the time pure fantasy.

            On the subject of guns, Jewett and Lawrence have a fascinating passage that is worth quoting in full. They write about the mystique of violence that has “imparted a distinctive character to American wars” (p. 254), rising first from Mexican war, and helping to “prepare the way for the Civil War in the 1860s”. They write:

As Michael Bellesiles has shown, the Civil War also ‘altered the national character’ and showed ‘the need for one American to be able to kill another’ with a firearm. For the first time in American history, guns had been made widely available by mass production, and they were in popular use. While guns had rarely played a significant role in American life for its first two hundred years, the Colt Company had begun in the 1840s to merchandize its pistols with mythic engravings of men defending their families against Indians with a Colt pistol. It was after the Civil War that the company perfected revolvers that would fire self-contained metal cartridges, which Colt called ‘the Peacemaker.’ According to Bellesiles, ‘The Wichita Eagle reported in May 1874 that ‘Pistols are as thick as blackberries.’ By that time a gun seemed to most men a requisite for their very identity…The Civil War transformed the gun from a tool into a perceived necessity. The war preserved the Union, unifying the nation around a single icon: the gun.’” (p. 255, quoting Bellesiles, Arming America: The Origins of a National Gun Culture, New York: Vintage Books, 2000, pp. 429, 379, 430).

I suspect that the fondness of many Americans for the gun (leaving aside arguments derived from the Second Amendment) stems from the depiction of much gun violence in action and superhero movies. Apart from the fact that the hero has nine lives (if not more), the amount of shooting and blowing things up that goes on, makes it difficult to know who’s a “good guy” and who’s a “bad guy”.

            Against “zealous nationalism” Jewett and Lawrence place “the tradition of prophetic realism.” This, they state, “avoids taking the stances of complete innocence and selflessness. It seeks to redeem the world for coexistence by impartial justice that claims no favored status for individual nations.” (8) They use the description “prophetic realism” a little loosely at times, I feel, as it sometimes stands simply for anything opposed to zealous nationalism, even if the motivating factor is more likely to be pragmatic politics.

            Their book is itself an exercise in prophetic realism, and is well worth reading and pondering. While it is one thing to look at the United States from the outside (as a non-American) and consider its faults, it is both heartening and welcome to see that prophets within provide cogent and clear critique. They are the best prophets: hopefully not without honour.