The results of the referendum on our voting system are now in, and we have decided to retain MMP. Now we turn our attention to how this system might be adapted to better serve the interests of the electorate and the principle of proportionality.
As an ordinary voter who is in favour of MMP, I want nevertheless to write about an aspect of the political discourse around MMP to which I object. I also want to make a suggestion about a feature that I think we might change.
Political commentators often talk about “wasted votes”. These votes are, of course, those cast for minor parties that fail to cross the 5% threshold, and fail to win an electorate seat. They are discounted when determining the allocation of parliamentary seats.
In a democracy the only votes that are truly “wasted” are those that are never cast in the first place. Of votes cast, “wasted votes” are those that are classed as “informal votes”. Most voters vote with the intention of achieving some effect, though the system renders some of these intentions ineffectual.
Let me illustrate from my own voting habits. In the 2008 election, my party vote went to the Progressive Party. I voted this way because I wanted to see Jim Anderton’s colleague, Matt Robson, whom I regarded as an effective politician, returned to Parliament. I knew that Anderton was almost certain to retain his electorate seat (which, of course, he did). This meant that the Progressives did not need to receive 5% of the party vote to get another candidate in (something around 1.5%, I think, would have done it). As it happened, not enough of my fellow voters also cast their votes for the Progressives. My “strategic vote” was ineffective, and hence “wasted”.
In my opinion, to call these votes “wasted” is not only insulting, but it is inherently anti-democratic if it operates to dissuade voters from following their inclinations. Moreover, these votes are, in effect, not so much “wasted” as disregarded. And in a sense, they are also “diverted” or “transferred” to other successful parties.
This is because when MMP was devised, Parliament decided that it is the proportion of party votes a party receives that decides the number of seats allocated to that party. But when a proportion of the party votes are removed from the equation, the allocation of seats is adjusted to allow for that. Hence, party votes do not translate into seats on a “strictly” proportional basis.
Rather a mathematical formula called the Sainte-Laguë allocation formula is used. I don’t fully understand this: could we have one of our political commentators, or political science experts explain it in plain English, please? But the effect of it appears to advantage the parties that are left in the pool, as it were: particularly the parties that poll the higher percentages of party votes.
To illustrate: in this election, National got just on 48% of the party vote, which on strictly proportional terms would give it 58 seats in a 120 seat Parliament. Instead, if it retains Waitakere (at the moment this seems likely), it gets 60 seats, which is 50% of the seats. In 2008, with 45.5% of the votes, National received 58 seats (55 seats would have more closely represented their “percentage share”).
MMP as it currently operates also allows for parties that gain one electorate seat to have their share of the party vote counted: so that, for instance, in 2008 the Act Party by winning Epsom and getting 3.65% of the party vote, was allocated five seats. NZ First, of course, polled 4.07% of the party vote, but did not win an electorate seat, so that their share of the party votes was discounted.
In my opinion, the Electoral Commission’s website is misleading when it states that “a party vote cast for a party that does not cross the threshold has no impact on the number of seats other parties receive”; or that these party votes “are not in any way reallocated to other parties”. The effect of the formula is that they are. To “sell” MMP as a system whereby the percentage of seats a party receives is “roughly equivalent” to the percentage of its party vote, is “false advertising” to say the least.
I believe that the number of seats a party receives under MMP should more straightforwardly reflect the percentage of party votes it gets. This will be achieved, I think, by lowering the 5% threshold so that allocation of seats more closely reflects the party vote percentages. On current polling figures, this should also do away with the need for “overhang” seats.
At any rate, the system should also be adjusted so that the number of seats in Parliament is capped at 120. Any party that gains only an electorate seat should be allocated only that seat, unless it is also able to cross the (lowered) threshold. This would move the MMP system closer to a Supplementary Member style Parliament, but would retain sufficient “list seats” to retain the proportionality of MMP.
Finally, as MMP comes under review, could we please have some good education about the system, and a decent debate, in the pages of the Herald? What are the merits and demerits of the opinions expressed above? Some, like me, will favour lowering the 5% threshold, others will want to see it raised. What are the pros and cons of lowering it? What are the pros and cons of raising it? And by how much should it go up or down? There are other elements of the system that need review. What are they, and what changes will deliver the best outcomes?
One of the tasks of the review will be to come to terms with a public perception which lingers from before 1996 that electorate seats are real seats, and list seats are a cunning ruse to stack the parliament. Derek, you are clearly in the opposite camp, and after the Epsom "strategic vote ACT" fiasco, many people may be with you.
ReplyDeleteFor many people the practical question will be to ask if we get better government by increasing the number of minor parties in parliament, and necessarily the wheeling and dealing to form governments.